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The International Forum for Responsible Media Blog
(https://inforrm.files.wordpress.com/2015/05
/c2a350‐pound‐notes.jpg)The   case   of   Gulati   v
MGN   Ltd   [2015]   EWHC   1482
(http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch
/2015/1482.html) (Ch), to which the attention of
this   blog’s   readers   has   already   been   drawn   here
(https://inforrm.wordpress.com/2015/05/22/case‐law‐gulati‐v‐mgn‐
ltd‐a‐landmark‐decision‐on‐the‐quantum‐of‐privacy‐damages‐
hugh‐tomlinson‐qc‐and‐sara‐mansoori/),   is   a   complex  but   important
case. In particular, the fact that no publication to the world at large had
occurred in the case of one claimant, and that the element of distress
was   considerably   downplayed   because   the   hacking   had   occurred










argued,   is  not  to  mix  and  match  them  (something  that  Mann  J.  only








Being  consequences  of   the  wrong   they  are  by  construction  separate
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and   there  exists  no  universally  agreed‐upon   list  of  such   losses);  but




While   the  point   is  not  entirely  straightforward,   it  should  not  be   too
diﬃcult to accept that these non‐pecuniary losses all boil down, in the
final analysis, to distress (in a broad and non‐technical sense): as Prof.






rather   the  argument   is   that   all   such  non‐pecuniary   losses   (listed   in
McGregor  on  Damages  (19th  ed,  Sweet  &  Maxwell  2014),  §5‐003  as:  (i)
‘physical   inconvenience  and  discomfort’,   (ii)   ‘pain  and  suﬀering  and
loss of amenities’, (iii) ‘mental distress’, (iv) ‘social discredit’) boil down




The  claimant’s  bodily   integrity  has  been  violated:  he  will   (typically)
suﬀer some pecuniary loss (medical expenses, loss of earnings etc) and
also some non‐pecuniary loss (‘PSLA’ in the lingo: Pain and Suﬀering
and   Loss   of   Amenities).   On   that   model   his   physical   injury   is
transparent:   it   is  a  peg  on  which   losses  hang.   It  needs   to  be   there
because without it the loss would not be wrongful in the first place, but
the   claimant   does   not   get   compensated   for   it;   rather   he   gets
compensated for the deleterious consequences.
Applied to privacy, this  model  regards  the  privacy‐breach  as  the  peg




pecuniary/non‐pecuniary  dichotomy,  and   forces   the   law   to   confront
questions it is ordinarily adept at sweeping under the rug. The second
complication  is  that,  across  tort,  distress  is  rarely  actual  distress;  it  is
generally   presumed   or   deemed   distress:   how   bad   the   claimant   is
supposed to feel rather than how he really feels. So deemed in fact that,
as   is  well   known,   unconscious   claimants   can   recover   for   loss   of
amenities   (even   though   it   is   by   nature   a   form   of   distress).   This
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complication  will  be   ignored  here   so  as  not   to  make   things  overly
complicated.
To  summarise,   the  dominant  model  operates   in   two  stages:  first   the
wrong then the losses, which in turn are fundamentally of two and only







and   loss  of   a  kind   recognised  by   the   court   as  wrongful  has  been
caused’). But that is not another type of loss flowing from the breach as
per  the  above  model.  Indeed   loss  of  privacy  does  not  flow  from  the
breach of privacy in any meaningful sense: it is the breach itself looked
at from a diﬀerent angle. It is not a separate detriment that may or may
not   follow   the  wrong:   it   is  necessarily   there  by  virtue  of   the  breach
having occurred.
Language   inspired   by  Hugo  Grotius   (De   Iure  Belli   ac  Pacis   (1625),




unjustified   causation   of   the   relevant   loss.  On   that  model   the   two
elements, wrong and loss, are the flip side one of the other.
Alternatives
The   immediate  question   raised  by   the   identification  of   two  models
would seem to be, which is better? But that question will have to wait
for another day. Suﬃce it to note, for the record, that this note writer
has   considerable   sympathy   for   Mann   J’s   argument   (contra   the
uber‐dominant model) that this abstract notion of loss is the better one.
In  particular  it  allows  us  to  understand  why, like  here,  it  is  not  only
possible   but   desirable   to   grant   substantive   [i.e.   not   nominal],
compensatory   [i.e.   not   vindicatory]   damages   to   claimants  whose
privacy has been violated, regardless of whether or not they are out of
pocket  or  aggrieved  because  of   the  wrong   they  have  suﬀered   (§115:
‘The absence of distress does not that mean that there was any the less






models   are   grounded   in   incompatible   logics.   They   are   therefore
alternatives that cannot and should not be combined. On a principled
level,  combining  them  would  amount  to  adding  oranges  and  apples,
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right‐violations   and   the  deleterious   consequences   thereof,  which   is
impermissible.  Practically   it  would  mean   counting   the   same   injury
twice, which is equally impermissible for obvious reasons.
Let   us   unpack   this   argument.   If   the   law   compensates   the   ‘right‐
diminution’  it  should  not  also  compensate  for  the  economic  loss  that
flows   from   it   (by   ‘loss’  here   is  meant   the  direct  or   immediate   loss,
consequential  loss  being  a  diﬀerent  story  altogether).  Robert  Stevens’
example  of  substitutive  damages  for  a  smashed  car (R.  Stevens, Torts
and Rights (OUP 2007), p. 61) applies here, even though Prof. Stevens
was trying to make a rather diﬀerent point: if it costs £2,000 to repair
the   car,   the   claimant   cannot   get   £2,000   for   the  diminution   of   his
property  right   (the  value  of   the   infringement  being  determined  with
reference to the cost of repair) and then another £2,000 for the economic





damages   (which   are   now   widely,   and   rightly,   regarded   as
compensatory for a separate injury), the distress and the right‐invasion
are the same loss.
Again,  physical   injury   is  a  better   starting  point  because   it  has   this
concrete character which breach of privacy lacks. Thus, we know from
the judicial Guidelines that ‘total loss of taste and smell’ should lead to
compensatory  damages   ‘in   the   region  of   £28,000’   (Judicial  College,
Guidelines   for   the  assessment  of  general  damages   in  personal   injury  cases
(12th ed, OUP 2013), p. 8): but is that compensation for distress/PSLA or
is it compensation for the physical injury suﬀered by the claimant (i.e.











wrong   itself,   i.e.   the   diminution   of   the   claimant’s   privacy   (itself
sometimes described as a type of loss of ‘dignity’ or ‘autonomy’: these
are simply diﬀerent words to describe the same reality at a higher level
of  generality).   In   so  doing   it   clearly   rejects  Matthew  Nicklin  QC’s
argument, which was an almost picture‐perfect defence of the bipolar
model:   all   that   can   be   compensated   is   distress   flowing   from   the
invasion, there being no financial loss alleged in the instant case.
The diﬃculty is that, not having identified the above tension between
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two   conflicting  models   of  wrong   and   loss,   the   court   only   partly
repudiates the dominant ‘bipolar’ model, according to which the wrong
is  transparent  and what  matters  is  its  consequences,  despite  its  being




judgment,   the  court  oscillates  between  putting   the   two   losses  on   the




it seems,  realising  that they  are  mutually exclusive:  on  the  one  hand,
that there should be damages for distress and for loss of privacy (e.g.
§111, end of §130, §143); on the other hand, that it is ‘unnecessary, if not
inappropriate’  (§130)  to  award  damages  for  loss  of  privacy  on  top  of
damages for distress when there is in fact such distress, the suggestion
being that this would be double recovery. At §134 Mann J. comes very
close   to   recognising   that   the  distress   is   the  flipside  of   the  privacy‐
infringement, hence one injury and one compensatory award. In other
words the court oscillates between a pure unipolar model (the loss is








persons)  and  should  not get  more  because  he  is  in  fact  distressed, or
distressed   in  a  more‐than‐average  way  –  unless  and  until  a  separate
harm (i.e. the violation of another right) can be identified, which would
rightly trigger aggravated damages. But there is no denying that such a
view,  rooted   in  a  very  broad  understanding  of   loss  as  any  violation




even   though   this   is   the   easy  way   out   and   therefore   a   constant
temptation.
Eric  Descheemaeker   is   Reader   in   European   Private   Law   at   the
University   of   Edinburgh.   This   post   builds   on   a   note   initially
circulated  on  the  Obligations  Discussion  Group  run  by  Prof.  Jason
Neyers at the University of Western Ontario.
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